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1. Introduction 
Common-sense morality denies that you are always required to do what is best from 
an impartial point of view. According to one interpretation of this postulate, this 
means that you have 
Agent-Centred Moral Options (henceforth just “options”): A permission to 
bring about an outcome that is impartially suboptimal because it promotes 
your own or your intimates’ interests.1 
This interpretation of options maintains that you can sometimes permissibly do what 
is impartially suboptimal, but you are not required to do it—that is, you are still per-
mitted to do what is impartially best. Many people believe that options of this sort 
exist, but they are tricky to defend.2  Much debate has consequently focused on how, 
and if at all, different moral theories can accommodate them.3  
This paper argues that matters are even more complicated than has previously been 
recognised. I defend a new kind of option which I call an 
Other-Sacrificing Option: A permission to bring about an impartially subop-
timal outcome because it discounts your adversaries’ interests. 
Your adversaries are those with whom you stand in a morally negative personal rela-
tionship. This relationship is constituted by a morally significant history of negative 
interactions. If you have a choice between giving a moderate benefit to your adversary 
                                                        
1 Scheffler (1982) calls these options “agent-centred prerogatives”. The difference is only 
terminological. I follow Kagan (1989), pp. 6-10, and understand “interests” here broadly as 
opposed to narrowly in terms of pure self-concern. 
2 Kagan (1989) argues at length that options cannot plausibly be defended. 
3 The locus classicus for a defence of an agent-centred prerogative is Scheffler (1982). Other 
defences of options, though by no means exhaustive, are Sider (1993), Portmore (2003; 2008), 
and Bader (forthcoming).  
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or a comparatively smaller benefit to a stranger, I argue that you can be permitted to 
benefit the stranger.  
I defend other-sacrificing as follows. Sections 2 and 3 each give an argument for the 
permissibility of other-sacrificing: an intuitive argument and a symmetry argument. 
Section 4 considers the relation between other-favouring and other-sacrificing options. 
I explore a view according to which you cannot discount the interests of your adver-
saries as much as you can favour the interests of your intimates. Section 5 concludes 
by examining two of the most promising approaches for justifying options. I find that 
only one of them has the resources to account for the evolution of your permitted 
other-favouring and other-sacrificing in moral space. 
2. The Intuitive Argument 
Suppose that in 
Intimate vs. You.4 You can either 
1. Benefit your intimate by 1; or 
2. Benefit yourself by 5. 
If you have a choice between providing a small benefit to an intimate or a moderately 
greater benefit to yourself, impartial consequentialism says that you must give the ben-
efit to yourself, because this will bring about the most good. Common sense morality 
                                                        
4 Most of the cases that will be considered in what follows are abstract, but nonetheless 
informative. I focus on outcomes and make simplifying assumptions about the means by 
which you might be helping or burdening people. I understand the bestowing of benefits as 
including the prevention of evils, assume that prospective benefits and burdens are unowned, 
and set aside issues to do with the exact causal-structure of the provision of benefits and bur-
dens in question. 
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disagrees. It says that you can permissibly give less weight to your own good and give 
the small benefit to your intimate. However, you are generally not required to do so. 
Put more abstractly, some think that since it is permissible to give the smaller benefit 
to your intimate in Intimate vs. You, you have a 
Self-Sacrificing Option5: A permission to bring about an impartially subopti-
mal outcome because it discounts your own interests.  
Suppose next that in  
Intimate vs. Intimate. You can either 
1. Benefit one of your intimates by 1; or 
2. Benefit another intimate by 5. 
If you have a choice between providing a small benefit to one of your intimates or a 
moderately greater benefit to another intimate, who is equally dear to you, many think 
that you may not permissibly give your intimate the lesser benefit. You are required to 
give the greater benefit to the second intimate.  
These two cases are in some respects parallel, yet your permissions differ. The benefits 
that you can provide in each case are the same, but you may only permissibly choose 
to forgo the provision of the greater benefit in Intimate vs. You. A natural explanation 
for this difference is the fact that in Intimate vs. You you face the choice of sacrificing 
your own good whereas in Intimate vs. Intimate you face the choice of sacrificing the 
greater good of someone else, namely of one of your intimates.6 We might therefore 
conclude that there exists a morally significant Self-/Other Asymmetry.  
                                                        
5 Stocker (1976) first noted the existence of this option. See also Slote (1984; 1985). For a 
detailed discussion of the relation between self-sacrificing options and options to favour your 
own interests, see Hurka and Shubert (2012). 
6 For an argument why consent is not a relevant explanation, see Stocker (1976), pp. 210-
12, and Slote (1984), pp. 190-1.  
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Many think that the Self-/Other Asymmetry categorically rules out the permissibility 
of other-sacrificing. Douglas Portmore expresses this point as follows: 
“On common-sense morality, there is an asymmetry between what an agent is per-
mitted to do to herself and what she is permitted to do to others (hence, the name): 
specifically, whereas it is permissible for an agent to sacrifice her own greater good for 
the sake of providing others with some lesser net benefit, it is not permissible for an 
agent to sacrifice someone else’s greater good (even with her permission) for the sake 
of providing yet others with some lesser net benefit.”7  
This claim is false. Though other-sacrificing is impermissible in Intimate vs. Intimate, 
it does not follow that it is always impermissible. It can be permissible within the 
domain concerned with partiality to your adversaries as opposed to your intimates.  
To recognise this domain, suppose that you conceive of yourself and your personal 
relationships as existing in a kind of moral space.8 You are closest to yourself. The 
distance between you and someone else—but not necessarily between you and your-
self—is a function of the personal relationship that you have with them.9 Among other 
variables, this function may include the nature of your personal relationship interac-
tions, the intensity of your relationship, and whether your relationship is one-direc-
tional or reciprocal. Your intimates such as your family members or friends are closer 
to you in moral space than strangers by virtue of the positive personal relationship that 
                                                        
7 Portmore (2008), p. 411. This asymmetry was first introduced by Stocker (1976), section 
2, and later more extensively explored by Slote (1985), ch. 1. See also Sider (1993). 
8 Broad (1942), p. 55, has alluded to moral space in the context of special obligations and 
Bader (2016; forthcoming) provides a more explicit account of moral space. Nozick (1974), 
p. 57, has written about moral space in the slightly different context of moral rights. 
9 For simplicity, I here assume that the totality of facts of how people relate to one another 
determines net moral distance. This leaves open the possibility of multidimensional accounts 
of moral space, which would allow for “frenemy” relationships—i.e. relationships with people 
who are a dear intimate and bitter adversary in equal respects. 
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you have with them. Your positive personal relationships are constituted by histories 
of various forms of morally significant positive encounters.  
Strangers represent a morally neutral midpoint. They represent how much you should 
promote their interests independent of any personal relationships that you have with 
them.  
If your intimates are the ones located closer to you in moral space, then there can also 
be people who are morally distant from you—that is, located farther away from you 
than strangers. These people are your adversaries. They are more distant from you than 
strangers by virtue of your negative personal relationship with them. Your negative 
personal relationships are constituted by histories of various morally significant nega-
tive encounters. 
Illustration 1. Distance in Moral Space 
 
Other-sacrificing is impermissible when you are concerned with bestowing benefits on 
your intimates. However, other-sacrificing can be permissible when you are concerned 
with bestowing benefits on your adversaries. 
Suppose that in 
Stranger vs. Adversary. You can either 
1. Benefit a stranger by 1; or 
2. Benefit your adversary by 5. 
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This case is parallel to Intimate vs. Intimate except that your personal relationship to 
some of your beneficiaries has changed. Whereas you previously had the choice of 
sacrificing the good of your intimates with whom you stood in a morally positive re-
lationship, you now face the prospect of sacrificing the good of your adversaries for 
someone with whom you stand in a morally neutral personal relationship.  
The fact that you stand in a morally negative personal relationship with your adver-
saries is morally significant. It can render it permissible for you to discount the benefits 
that you can give them. We may think that you are therefore permitted to give the 
lesser benefit to the stranger in Stranger vs. Adversary.  
Here is a vignette that lends colour to Stranger vs. Adversary and elicits the normatively 
significant factors that characterise adversarial personal relationships and justify an 
other-sacrificing response: 
Callous Colleague: Imagine that Ann’s co-worker Beth has recently been very 
mean to her with no justified cause. Ann has tried talking to Beth about them 
having gotten off on the wrong foot, but Beth has not shown any willingness 
to change. Suppose now that Beth could really use Ann’s help with preparing 
a document for an upcoming meeting, a favour that Ann could grant Beth 
easily by having a chat with her, hence making her very happy. However, sup-
pose that Ann could also instead help her new co-worker Chloe with preparing 
a document for her first weekly report. For this she would have to have an 
equally long chat with her. This would make Chloe happy, though not quite 
as much as Beth receiving Ann’s help. Further, suppose that Chloe herself has 
also had a rough start at her new workplace and has been mean to almost all 
of her new colleagues except Ann, who she has not met yet.  
Assuming that Ann must make a choice to help either Beth or Chloe, that the cost of 
helping both in the form of a short clarifying conversation is the same, and that Beth 
and Chloe have been equally mean to people in the past, is Ann permitted to give less 
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weight to the prospectively greater benefit that she could give to Beth and instead help 
Chloe?  
Intuitively, it seems that Ann is indeed permitted to discount the interest of Beth by 
virtue of their history of negative interactions. Though, for example, a single act of 
needlessly failing to approve Ann’s admin request or unduly criticising Ann’s work 
may not overall justify a discounting response with notable practical upshots, a history 
of these negative acts becomes more noticeably normatively significant.10 The fact that 
Beth fails to adjust her behaviour upon being repeatedly confronted by Ann creates a 
morally negative personal relationship that is constituted by a history of acts of hin-
dering, ingratitude, as well as a lack of cooperation. 
However, though Ann’s other-sacrificing response is reasonable, it does seem like an 
intuitive stretch to assert that Ann is required to provide her adversary with the lesser 
benefit. We might think that though there is something morally admirable about their 
choosing not to act on their other-sacrificing permission, to suggest that it would be 
wrong if they chose to do so is implausible. You are never required to sacrifice the 
interests of your adversaries. 
It is worth clarifying that Ann has a distinctively agent-relative as opposed to agent-
neutral response to discount the prospective benefit that she could bestow on Beth —
                                                        
10 See Kolodny (2010) for an attempt to explain the normative significance of historical 
interactions by appeal to a resonance principle. In his discussion of negative partiality, he argues 
that morally negative personal relationships can never justify a retaliatory response in the form 
of harming your adversary (pp. 186-9). This claim is consistent with (though not necessarily 
implied by) my view in this discussion, since I defend a permission to discount as opposed to 
harm an individual with whom you have a negative personal relationship. I consider the con-
ditions under which other-sacrificing options may imply a permission to burden your adver-
saries at the end of section 4. 
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it is a justified response for Ann, but not necessarily for anyone one else.11 For example, 
it is not fully explained by the fact that Beth morally deserves to be treated less favour-
ably considered from an impartial point of view. Explaining the permissible discount-
ing of your adversaries’ interests entirely by appeal to the fact that they are impartially 
less deserving of being benefitted is as implausible as attempting to explain the per-
missible favouring of your intimates’ interests by appeal to them being more deserving 
of being benefitted. Neither positive partiality to your intimates nor negative partiality 
to your adversaries is entirely reducible to agent-neutral considerations such as moral 
desert. 
3. The Symmetry Argument 
The previous section made the intuitive case for other-sacrificing options. But we can 
say more to support their existence: We can appeal to reasons of symmetry. If sym-
metry considerations lead us from independently plausible phenomenon A to some 
other phenomenon B, then this provides some evidence for the plausibility of phe-
nomenon B. 
There exist two ways to conceptualise the various types of suboptimal behaviour that 
common-sense morality typically countenances. I here do not commit to either con-
ception. My aim is merely to show that both of them allow us to appeal to symmetry 
considerations to derive the permissibility of other-sacrificing, and, more problemati-
cally, perhaps even the requirement to do so. 
Here is the first picture. According to what we can call the 
                                                        
11 Neither is Beth permitted to discount Ann’s interests. Ann can discount Beth’s interests 
but not vice versa since Ann does not mirror Beth’s negative behaviour. More generally, this 
illustrates that morally negative personal relationships can be asymmetrical: You are not neces-
sarily your adversary’s adversary. 
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List Picture, impartially suboptimal behaviour should be understood in terms 
of a list of different permissions.12 
On this view, there exists a list of different kinds of options, based on who enjoys the 
benefits or suffers the burdens—oneself, or others.  
That is, the fact that common-sense morality sometimes allows you to give more 
weight to your interests than the interests of strangers is understood in the form of  
Self-Favouring Option13: A permission to bring about an impartially subopti-
mal outcome because it favours your own interests. 
And the fact that you are sometimes allowed to give more weight to the interests of 
your intimates than to the interests of strangers, is accordingly understood as an 
Other-Favouring Option: A permission to bring about an impartially subop-
timal outcome because it favours your intimates’ interests. 
We can illustrate the List Picture as follows: 
Table 1. List Picture of Moral Options 
Focal point / Response type Favouring Sacrificing 
Self- Self-Favouring Option Self-Sacrificing Option 
Other- Other-Favouring Option ? 
(Needless to say, I think an other-sacrificing option belongs into the bottom-right cell 
and should be added to the list.) 
                                                        
12 This is by far the most common picture of options. Theorists that rely on this picture are 
Kagan (1989), Scheffler (1982), Sider (1993), and Portmore (2006; 2008).  
13 Early discussions of this permission are in Parfit (1977), Davis (1980), and Scheffler 
(1982).  
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We can hold a different view. Here is the second picture of options. According to what 
we can call the  
Agent- Neutral/Relative Picture, impartially suboptimal behaviour should be 
understood in terms of permissibly acting from an agent-relative point of 
view.14 
This picture understands options as a permission to take on and act from an agent-
relative perspective that is sensitive to moral closeness facts. You can centre this per-
spective on the person who is acting (agent) or the person who is being acted upon 
(patient). If you centre this perspective on yourself when you are concerned with ben-
efitting your intimates, then their interests will matter more to you by virtue of the 
shorter moral distance between you and them. This can render it permissible for you 
to favour your intimates’ interests over those of strangers even if this brings a subopti-
mal outcome from the agent-neutral perspective. The agent-neutral perspective ab-
stracts from any particular perspective.  
The contrast with the List Picture becomes more apparent by considering the follow-
ing illustration: 
Table 2. Agent- Neutral/Relative Picture of Moral Options 
Focal Point / 
Modification 
Close (Favouring) Unmodified 
/ Neutral  
Distant (Discounting) 
Agent-Neutral Impartiality 
Agent-Relative 
Positive Partiality  
(oneself and others) 
Neutral  
Partiality 
? 
                                                        
14 Kamm (1992), pp. 362-3, seems to allude to this kind of picture. Bader (forthcoming), 
section 3, endorses it explicitly.  
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In contrast to the List Picture that stipulates different kinds of options, this picture 
understands the various ways to engage in suboptimal behaviour in a unified fashion 
as acting from an agent-relative perspective. For example, the option to sacrifice your 
own interests for an intimate may be understood as your taking on the perspective of 
that intimate and favouring their interests from their own agent-relative point of 
view.15 
This means that according to this picture there only exists what we might call an 
Agent-Relative-Favouring Option: A permission to bring about an impartially 
suboptimal outcome because it favours your own or your intimates’ interests 
from the agent-relative perspective. 
It is irrelevant for our purposes which of these two pictures of options is correct. Rea-
sons of symmetry support the permissibility of other-sacrificing on either of them. 
Other-sacrificing options can be understood as the negative mirror image of the other-
favouring and agent-relative-favouring option. We can see this by making explicit the 
negative counterparts of the constitutive elements of both options. Once we do this, 
we will end up with an other-sacrificing option. 
Illustration 2. Negative Mirror of Other-Favouring 
                                                        
15 Though the Agent-Neutral/Relative Picture could construe self-sacrificing options as a 
form of patient-self-favouring, it is another matter whether it should; see Bader (forthcoming), 
section 6, for a discussion of the problems involved in doing so.  
There is also a more general worry. As Slote (1984), p. 185, observes, despite their intuitive 
appeal, self-sacrificing options appear antithetical to the idea that moral closeness increases 
your options to favour. Some may take this tension to reinforce the plausibility of the List 
Picture—which need not ascribe ultimate explanatory significance to moral closeness facts—
whereas others might see it as reason to be sceptical about the existence of self-sacrificing op-
tions altogether. I flag, but do not settle this issue here.  
13 
 
Other-favouring and agent-relative favouring options are forms of positive partiality 
to your intimates. You are permitted to favour the interests of your intimates over 
those of strangers by virtue of your positive personal relationships with them. Positive 
relationships with your intimates include normatively significant histories of interac-
tions of, for example, aid, trust, gratitude, or cooperation, whereas your relationships 
with strangers, or rather the absence thereof, lack such a history.16 As a result of your 
positive relationships with your intimates, they are morally closer to you than 
strangers, and you are permitted to favour them. 
If there can be permissible positive partiality to your intimates, then symmetry suggests 
that there can also be permissible negative partiality to your adversaries. The permis-
sible attitude to take toward your adversaries is the negative mirror of the permissible 
attitude that you can take toward your intimates. This means that you are permitted 
to discount as opposed to favour the interests of your adversaries. The ground of your 
                                                        
16 I’m not claiming that all positive personal relationships are constituted by these kinds of 
interactions. For example, the parent-child relationship is structurally very different from the 
relationship between friends and characterised by distinctive interactions. See Lange (manu-
script-a) for a discussion of permissible parental partiality. My claim is only that, insofar as 
there exist certain positive interactions that constitute positive personal relationships, they 
have negative counterparts. 
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permission to discount your adversaries is the negative mirror of the ground of your 
permission to favour your intimates. If you are permitted to favour your intimates by 
virtue of your positive personal relationships with them, then you are permitted to 
discount your adversaries by virtue of your negative personal relationships with them. 
The constitutive elements of your negative personal relationships with your adversaries 
are the negative mirror of the constitutive elements of your personal relationships with 
your intimates. Negative relationships can be characterised by normatively significant 
interactions of, for example, hindering, distrust, ingratitude, and lack of cooperation.  
We might now wonder: If reasons of symmetry can lead us from other-favouring to 
other-sacrificing options, can symmetry also lead us from duties to favour your inti-
mates over strangers to duties to discount your adversaries?17 I previously suggested 
that requirements to discount your adversaries are intuitively implausible. However, 
symmetry seems to imply their existence.  
Whether this is so depends on our picture of options. I have here characterised the List 
Picture as only concerned with different kinds of options, but we might think that it 
naturally lends itself to a more encompassing interpretation: one that also includes 
duties of positive partiality to your intimates. If this is correct, then it seems natural to 
think that the List Picture should add duties to discount your adversaries—the nega-
tive mirror of positive duties of partiality to favour your intimates—to its list.  
By contrast, the Agent-Neutral/Relative Picture cannot, at the same time, both imply 
the existence of other-sacrificing options as well as other-sacrificing duties. According 
to the interpretation of the picture that I have given here, you always have the choice 
to act from the agent-relative perspective, but you do not have to do it. This interpre-
tation of the picture can therefore not generate duties of partiality—positive or nega-
tive—at all.18 According to a second interpretation, you are always required to act from 
                                                        
17 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to explore this idea in more 
detail. 
18 This is Bader’s view (forthcoming). 
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your agent-relative perspective, perhaps precisely because it is your perspective. This 
interpretation implies the existence of certain kinds of duties of partiality, including 
duties to favour your intimates over strangers and, by appeal to symmetry, duties to 
discount your adversaries. However, it cannot account for options.  
So, either we get both other-sacrificing options and duties (List Picture), only options, 
but no duties of positive partiality (1st interpretation Agent-Neutral/Relative Picture), 
or no options and only duties of partiality (2nd interpretation Agent-Neutral/Relative 
Picture). None of these possibilities seems entirely satisfactory.  
4. The Fabric of Other-Sacrificing  
If you are permitted to discount the interests of your adversaries, to what extent can 
you discount them? Is negative partiality to your adversaries the negative mirror of 
positive partiality to your intimates?  
We can make more headway on these questions by reflecting on the relation between 
the evolution of the degree of your permitted other-favouring and other-sacrificing 
options through varying distance in moral space.19  
First, imagine that in 
Stranger vs. Close Intimate. You can either 
1. Benefit a stranger by 5; or 
                                                        
19 There is an alternative to reflecting on your permitted other-favouring and other-sacri-
ficing at this coarse-grained level of partiality. We can also examine how the constitutive ele-
ments and nature of positive and negative personal relationships influence your permitted 
other-favouring and other-sacrificing. For example, we might think that reciprocal positive 
personal relationships increase your permitted other-favouring whereas reciprocal negative 
personal relationships decrease your permitted other-sacrificing, perhaps even to the point of 
permitting no discounting at all. See Lange (manuscript-b) for a fine-grained analysis of this 
sort. 
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2. Benefit your close intimate by 1. 
If you can give a small benefit to your intimate or a moderately greater benefit to a 
stranger, intuitively it seems that you can permissibly care more about your close inti-
mate and benefit them as opposed to the stranger. However, it seems intuitively im-
plausible that you can favour their interests a whole lot more over those of strangers. 
If the prospective benefit to the stranger becomes large enough, you will be required 
to benefit them instead. Suppose that you are permitted to favour your close intimate 
by a ratio of 1:5 and give them the comparably lesser benefit. 
Suppose now that in 
 Stranger vs. Very Close Intimate. You can either 
1. Benefit a stranger by 10; or 
2. Benefit your very close intimate by 1.20 
If you have a choice between giving a small benefit to your very close intimate or a 
much larger benefit to a stranger, we might think that you can permissibly benefit 
your intimate.  
This seems intuitively plausible. You are permitted to favour the interests of your re-
cent acquaintance whom you met at a dinner party to some degree, but you are surely 
permitted to favour the interests of your very good friend whom you have known since 
your childhood more. Your permitted other-favouring might consequently increase as 
the moral distance between you and your intimates decreases as shown in the following 
illustration. 
                                                        
20 For clarification: I assume that the pairs of “close intimate” and “distant adversary” and 
“very close intimate” and “very distant adversary” are negative mirrors in moral space respec-
tively.  
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Illustration 3. Evolution of Permitted Other-Favouring I21 
 
In a nutshell: you can favour your intimates more, the closer they are to you.  
Some might be drawn towards a more nuanced view. Suppose that in 
Stranger vs. Very Close Intimate*. You can either 
1. Benefit a stranger by 9; or 
2. Benefit your very close intimate by 1. 
We might think that even though you can favour your friends more the closer they 
are to you, you cannot favour a very close intimate twice as much as a close intimate.  
Accordingly, the evolution of your permitted other-favouring might look more like 
one of the two dotted lines as shown in this graph: 
Illustration 4. Evolution of Permitted Other-Favouring II 
                                                        
21 The illustrations in this section are intended as rough visualizations of what is said in 
words. They do not purport to offer precise mathematical quantifications of moral space or 
degrees of favouring/sacrificing.   
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Once your dinner party acquaintance turns into a good friend of yours, you will be 
increasingly permitted but also required to favour their interests.  
Let’s consider other-sacrificing. Suppose that in  
Stranger vs. Distant Adversary. You can either 
1. Benefit a stranger by 1; or 
2. Benefit your distant adversary by 5. 
If you have a choice between giving a small benefit to a stranger or a slightly greater 
benefit to your distant adversary, we might think that you are permitted to benefit the 
stranger instead. If you think that this view is correct, then you believe that you can 
favour your intimates as much as you can discount your adversaries. 
Though theoretically neat, this view may seem counterintuitive to some. Consider two 
personal relationships that are exact negative counterparts of each other: a morally 
positive personal relationship with your recent friend that you have met at a dinner 
party and a morally negative personal relationship with a recent bully that you have 
made at another dinner party and who has been nasty to you. Intuitively, there is some 
19 
pull to say that though it is permissible to favour your intimate’s interests, it is imper-
missible to discount those of your adversary. You are permitted to bring your recent 
friend medicine that will alleviate their mild headache as opposed to give your newly-
moved-in neighbour some other medicine that will cure their severe cold; however, 
you are not permitted to alleviate your new neighbour’s mild headache instead of 
providing your recent bully with a medicine to cure their severe cold.22  
If you think that these considerations have some persuasive force, then you think that 
you are not permitted discount your adversaries’ interests as much as you can favour 
your intimates’. Accordingly, we might think that although you can favour your inti-
mates’ interests by a ratio of 1:5, you are not permitted to discount an adversary to the 
same degree. You are only permitted to discount them by less—let’s assume by a ratio 
of 1:4. 
Suppose now that in 
 Stranger vs. Very Distant Adversary. You can either 
1. Benefit a stranger by 1; or 
2. Benefit your very distant adversary by 8. 
If the ratio whereby you can discount all of your adversaries is 1:4, then you may 
permissibly give a small benefit to the stranger as opposed to a moderately greater 
benefit to your very distant adversary. This is because the moral distance between you 
and your adversary will have increased and the distance between you and the stranger 
will have remained unchanged. We can illustrate the above considerations about your 
permitted other-favouring again by a graph. 
Illustration 5. Evolution of Permitted Other-Sacrificing I 
                                                        
22 What explains the intuitive pull that when all things are equal—at level of partiality—
you are permitted more favouring of your intimates than discounting of your adversaries is a 
very difficult question. I attempt to explore it in more detail in Lange (manuscript-b). 
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In contrast to the slope that shows your permitted other-favouring (Illustration 3), the 
slope of this function of the evolution of your permitted other-sacrificing is less steep.  
As with the evolution of your permitted other-favouring, there exists a more nuanced 
view that we can hold. Imagine that in 
 Stranger vs. Very Distant Adversary*. You can either 
1. Benefit a stranger by 1; or 
2. Benefit your very distant adversary by 7. 
We might think that even though you can discount your adversaries more the more 
of an adversary they are for you, the degree to which you can discount them decreases 
as they move farther away from you in moral space.  
We can now ask: Does the decrease in your permitted other-sacrificing mirror the 
decrease in your permitted other-favouring? Intuitively, the answer is No. Consider 
Stranger vs. Very Distant Adversary**. You can either 
1. Benefit a stranger by 1; or 
2. Benefit your very distant adversary by 6. 
21 
We might think that not only the degree to which you discount your adversaries de-
creases the more of an adversary they are for you, but that this decrease in the degree 
of extensiveness is greater than the corresponding decrease in the extensiveness of your 
other-favouring permissions. This is the most nuanced view and allows for the least 
amount of other-sacrificing. 
Illustration 6. Evolution of Permitted Other-Sacrificing II 
 
Accordingly, the slope that models the evolution of your permitted other-sacrificing 
could be either more more concave or less steep than the slope of the other-favouring 
counterpart.  
The foregoing considerations about the relation between the evolution of the exten-
siveness of other-favouring and other-sacrificing options can be summarised more con-
cisely as follows: 
Illustration 7. Other-Favouring/Sacrificing Asymmetry 
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Other-Favouring/Sacrificing Asymmetry: The greater the moral distance be-
tween you and your intimates, the less you are permitted to favour them. The 
smaller the distance between you and your adversaries, the less you are permit-
ted to discount them. As the moral distance between you and your intimates 
decreases and the distance between you and your adversaries increases, your 
other-favouring options increase to a greater degree than your other-sacrificing 
options.  
This phenomenon is the analogue of an evolution between your permitted self-favour-
ing and self-sacrificing through decreasing moral space.23 
                                                        
23 Specifically, symmetry suggests that the greater the distance in moral space between you 
and your intimates, the more you are permitted to sacrifice yourself and the more you are 
permitted to favour yourself. As the moral distance between you and your intimates decreases, 
your self-sacrificing options decrease to a lesser degree than your self-favouring options.  
Insofar as this self-favouring/sacrificing asymmetry is plausible, it provides credibility for 
what we have observed in this section about the relation between other-favouring and other-
sacrificing options.  
However, some will find this asymmetry more plausible than others. Hurka and Shubert 
(2012) maintain that you are permitted more self-sacrificing with your intimates than with 
strangers, Bader (forthcoming) maintains that you are permitted more self-sacrificing with 
23 
We have explored a view according to which you are not permitted to discount your 
adversaries as much as you can favour your intimates. But what if the distance between 
you and your adversary becomes very large indeed?  
In moral space, you are the ultimate intimate, but there is no ultimate adversary and 
therefore no limit to the distance that can exist between you and your adversaries. 
Suppose that in 
 Stranger vs. Arch-Enemy.24 You can either 
1. Benefit a stranger by 1; or 
2. Burden your arch-enemy by 5. 
If you have a choice between providing a small benefit to a stranger and countenancing 
a moderate burden to a very distant adversary—and the distance between you and the 
adversary is sufficiently large—it seems that it can become permissible to burden your 
adversary as opposed to benefit a stranger. For you will be permitted to discount their 
interests so much that the manifestation of a burden in their life will, from your agent-
relative perspective, be a benefit to them. 
This conclusion seems repugnant. Even from the perspective of negative partiality, it 
is never permissible for you to let your adversaries suffer as opposed to others prosper. 
I can see two ways to avoid it. Firstly, we might think that, with increasing moral 
distance, the degree of your permitted other-sacrificing approximates zero. On this 
view, you would not be permitted any sacrificing at all of sufficiently distant adver-
saries. Alternatively, we might stipulate that it is never allowed to countenance certain 
                                                        
strangers than with intimates. Since this asymmetry states that your permitted self-sacrificing 
decreases as strangers become your intimates, Hurka and Shubert's account is likely to yield 
insufficiently extensive permissions to self-sacrifice your interests.  
24 The benefit/burden terminology intends to be making/allowing neutral. As I use the 
terms, when a course of action results in a burden for person X, this does not imply that X is 
being actively interfered with or harmed.  
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kinds of burdens to your adversaries. If we favour this strategy, then we have found a 
new reason for why a compelling defence of options must include an account of con-
straints.25 
5. Accommodating Other-Sacrificing 
There are two approaches in the literature for justifying options. Only one has the 
resources to accommodate other-sacrificing options and their relation to other-favour-
ing. 
According to  
Underivative Approaches, agent-centred options are grounded in independent 
and underivative permissions (as opposed to normative reasons).26 
A version of this approach that I consider here says that there is a prima facie duty of 
beneficence for you to promote the interests of everyone impartially, but in addition 
to this duty, you have permissions to either pursue or not pursue your own interest. In 
some cases, your permissions outweigh your duty of beneficence, and this grants you 
options not to bring about the impartially optimal outcome. Call this the Underivative 
View.27 
The Underivative View can accommodate other-sacrificing options by stipulating an 
underivative permission to not pursue your adversaries’ interests. This permission can 
then be weighed against your duty to promote the interests of everyone impartially, 
and, in some cases, outweigh it, thereby rendering other-sacrificing permissible.  
However, the Underivative View cannot fully account for the weight of other-sacrific-
ing options and fails to capture the Other-Favouring/Sacrificing Asymmetry. 
                                                        
25 See Kagan (1989), pp. 19-24, and chs. 3 and 4. 
26 Examples of these views Raz (1975), Gert (2004), and Hurka and Shubert (2012). 
27 This is Hurka and Shubert’s (2012), pp. 5-10, proposed view. 
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First, the Underivative View cannot account for the asymmetry between other-favour-
ing and other-sacrificing at the level of partiality. It can only account for this asym-
metry extensionally at the level of overall assessment by appealing to the interaction 
between your underivative permissions and special duties. 
However, even if it opts for this strategy, it cannot account for the fact that your other-
sacrificing permissions become weaker as the distance between you and your adver-
saries increases. It can tell the following story to explain why the extensiveness of your 
other-favouring options decreases as you move closer to your intimates. As someone 
becomes closer to you in moral space, your special duty to promote their interests 
increases in weight. You are required to favour your good friend more than your close 
acquaintance. As your special duty increases in weight, it tells against your permission 
to favour them more.28  
No analogous story can be told about the greater decrease in extensiveness of your 
other-sacrificing options. Three options present themselves. All of them fail.  
The first is to suggest that the weight of your duty of beneficence limits the extensive-
ness of your permitted other-sacrificing. However, this duty does not increase in 
weight as your adversary becomes more of an adversary for you. It remains constant, 
so it cannot explain the more concave evolution of the extensiveness of your permitted 
other-sacrificing.  
Perhaps the Underivative View can stipulate the existence of a weakened duty of be-
neficence to discount the interests of your enemies whose increasing weight tells 
against your permissions to other-sacrifice. But this implies that it can be wrong for 
you to give a greater benefit to your enemy as opposed to a smaller one to a stranger, 
which seems implausible.  
                                                        
28 But not so much that there is overall no net increase in the extensiveness of your other-
favouring permission (see previous section). 
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Lastly, the Underivative View might try to say that your special duty of reparations 
increases as the moral distance between you and your adversaries increases. As your 
opponent becomes an enemy, perhaps even an arch-enemy, you will have increasingly 
engaged in negative interactions that require you to compensate them. This means 
that the weight of your special duty to compensate your adversary will increase and 
weigh against your permission to other-sacrifice them. However, this argument pre-
supposes that there can be no negative personal relationships with long-term adver-
saries that are one-directional. That seems intuitively false.   
Let’s consider a second approach for justifying options. According to 
Reasons-based Approaches, permissions are grounded in the conflict of agent-
relative and agent-neutral reasons.29 
There are many different variants of reason-based views. I here consider one of the 
most promising frameworks.  
On this Agent-Relative Reason View, you have agent-neutral reason to do what is best 
from the impartial perspective and agent-relative reason to do what is best form the 
agent-relative perspective.30 You have a permission to act impartially suboptimally in 
some situation just in case your agent-neutral and agent-relative reason favour con-
flicting courses of action. If this is the case, then you are permitted to take on either 
perspective and do what is either agent-neutrally or agent-relatively optimal.  
                                                        
29 Scheffler (1982), Raz (1999), and Parfit (2011) develop the most widely known ap-
proaches. 
30 See Bader (forthcoming) for a defence of a decision-theoretic form of dual-ranking act-
consequentialism based on this framework of normative reasons. Another dual-ranking act-
consequentialism is developed by Portmore (2008). However, Portmore’s view cannot justify 
other-sacrificing options at all given its over-commitment to the moral significance of the Self-
/Other Asymmetry. 
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The Agent-Relative Reason View can accommodate other-sacrificing options as fol-
lows. It says that agent-relative reasons are modified agent-neutral reasons.31 The 
weight of your agent-relative reasons is a function of the distance in moral space be-
tween two agents. The distance between you and others in moral space is a function 
of your personal relationships with them. This means that you have stronger (intensi-
fied) agent-relative reason to promote the interests of your intimates who stand closer 
to you by virtue of your positive personal relationship with them.  
By the same token, you have weaker (attenuated) agent-relative reasons to promote 
the interests of your adversaries who are more distant from you than strangers by virtue 
of your negative personal relationship with them. Other-sacrificing options are hence 
a result of the conflict between your agent-neutral reason to promote the interests of 
everyone impartially and your weakened agent-relative reason to promote the interests 
of your adversaries.  
The Agent-Relative Reason View has the capacity to successfully account for the 
Other-Favouring/Sacrificing Asymmetry, but it is not clear that it can do so in a way that 
is not ad hoc.  
It can claim that the function which intensifies the weight of your agent-neutral rea-
sons is different from the function which attenuates them. The intensifying modifica-
tion function might be more concave than the attenuating modification function. To 
defend this solution plausibly, it would suit the Agent-Relative Reason View well to 
offer an explanation as to why the modification function should take this asymmetrical 
form. I cannot think of one.  
6. Conclusion 
                                                        
31 See Bader (2016) for a detailed development of this modifier-framework. 
28 
There exist other-sacrificing options. We might think that these options are in im-
portant respects asymmetrical to other-favouring options. Of the two views that I con-
sidered, I found that only one of them has the resources to accommodate other-sacri-
ficing options as well as their structural differences vis-à-vis other-favouring options in 
moral space.  
What are some upshots of this discussion? One is that any successful defence of options 
faces a more extensive task than many have acknowledged—perhaps we even have 
found new grounds to be sceptical about the project of defending options altogether. 
Another is that the domain of negative partiality deserves much more attention in 
ethical theorising than it has received so far.  
  
29 
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